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To protect private citizens from unreasonable intrusions upon
their "persons, houses, papers, and effects,"' the fourth amendment
requires a finding of "probable cause" before a search warrant may
be issued. 2 That provision fails, however, to delineate what constitutes probable cause, thus necessitating judicial interpretation.
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has searched for definitive standards by which determinations of probable cause can be
made.4 Such determinations have been particularly troublesome in
those cases involving the use of an informant's tip, either confidential, or, as in the case of Illhnois v. Gates,5 anonymous.6
On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department
received a handwritten, anonymous letter with no return address.7
The letter described in detail the ongoing illegal drug trafficking of
Lance and Sue Gates, a local couple, who made "their entiie living
[selling to] pushers." 8 The anonymous informant predicted an impending deal involving the transport of a large quantity of marijuana
amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2 Id Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [an officer's]
knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
3 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (probable cause deals with
probabilities and practical considerations, not legal technicalities); Nathanson v. United
States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (mere affirmance of belief or suspicion not. enough to find
probable cause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (reasonably trustworthy
information leading to belief of criminal activity sufficient to establish prdbable cause).
4 See Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813) (initial inquiry as to
standard for determining probable cause).
5 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 137-39 (discussing anonymous informants); infra
notes 65 & 79 (discussing confidential informants).
7 People v. Gates, 82 Il. App. 3d 749, 750, 403 N.E.2d 77, 78 (1980), aJ'd,85 Ill. 2d
376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
8 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325. The letter read, in part:
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys [sic]
down and drives it back. Sue flys [sic] back after she drops the car off in
Florida.
Id
U.S. CONST.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:189

from Florida to Bloomingdale, 9 specified the location of the Gates's
residence, ° and stated that the couple had "over $100,000 worth of
drugs in their basement.'' 1
Upon receipt of the letter, the Bloomingdale police chief delivered it to Detective Charles Mader, who promptly initiated a followup investigation. 12 Mader discovered that an Illinois driver's license
had been issued to Lance Gates,13 although the address shown
thereon was inconsistent with the one in the anonymous note.14 Consequently, Mader contacted his own confidential informant, who revealed that Lance Gates's actual place of residence coincided with
that given by the anonymous informant. 15
Mader also discovered from Officer Ott, a Chicago policeman
assigned to O'Hare Airport, that an "L. Gates" had made a reservation on an Eastern Airlines flight from Chicago to West Palm Beach
on May 5.16 At Detective Mader's request, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 17 maintained surveillance of that flight
and reported that Gates did, in fact, board the plane. 8 Shortly
9 Id. The informant alleged that on May 3, Sue Gates would drive to Florida and
within a few days, Lance would fly down and then drive the car back, "loaded with over
$100,000.00 in drugs." Id
10 Id The note stated that Lance and Sue Gates lived "on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums." Id
11 Id Had the letter's author not indicated that the Gates also had a large quantity
of drugs in their home, an additional issue may have arisen as to whether there existed
probable cause to search the premises. See tnfra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
12 People v. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d 376, 379-80, 423 N.E.2d 887, 888 (1981), rev'dsub nom.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
13 People v. Gates, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 751, 403 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1980), aj'd,85 Ill.
2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsub nom.Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). A
physical description of Lance Gates was obtained from this driver's license. This later
aided in identifying him while he was in the process of consummating the alleged drug
transaction. Id
14 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
15 People v. Gates, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 751, 403 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1980), aj'd,85 11. 2d
376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsub noma.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Detective Mader had, within the previous two years, obtained reliable information from this
informant resulting in seven criminal convictions. Id
16 Id Upon making this flight reservation, Gates gave his phone number as 980-8427.
The Illinois Bell Telephone Company verified this number as having been issued to
Lance B. Gates, whose address was 198 B Greenway Drive, the same as that indicated
by both the anonymous letter and the confidential informant. Id
17 The DEA, a Federal agency, is frequently called upon to maintain surveillance
and conduct investigatory operations in airports and, through the use of "drug courier
profiles," detect drug trafficking and intercept "couriers" transporting narcotics. See
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980). These profiles "describe the
characteristics generally associated with narcotics traffickers." Id But cf Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (seizure of defendant fitting "drug courier profile" unlawful because agents' unparticularized suspicion insufficient).
18 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
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thereafter, a DEA agent in Florida observed Gates arrive in West
Palm Beach, travel to a nearby Holiday Inn, and enter a room registered to Susan Gates.' 9
Early the following morning (May 6), Lance Gates and an unidentified woman left the hotel and, in a gray Mercury bearing Illinois license plates, drove northbound on a highway commonly used
by travelers heading to Chicago.2 ° Mader contacted the Illinois Secretary of State and discovered that the plates on the Mercury,
although registered to Lance Gates, 2' had been issued for a Hornet
station wagon.2 2
Detective Mader then filed a complaint for a search warrant,
attaching thereto a signed affidavit, which contained the foregoing
facts, as well as a copy of the anonymous letter. 23 The Circuit Court
Judge of DuPage County approved the request and issued a warrant
authorizing the police to search Mr. and Mrs. Gates, their Bloomingdale condominium, and the gray Mercury that they had driven from
Florida.2 4
At 5:15 a.m. on May 7, twenty-two hours after their departure
from West Palm Beach, the Gates arrived at their residence in
Bloomingdale, where Illinois police awaited their return.2 5 A search
of the Mercury, conducted pursuant to the warrant, uncovered more
than 350 pounds of marijuana, 26 while in the Gates' home, an additional twenty pounds of marijuana were found, along with drug
paraphenalia and unlicensed firearms.2 7 The Gates were arrested
and later indicted on narcotics and firearms charges. 28 Prior to trial,
they filed a motion to quash the arrest and search warrants, and to
suppress all evidence thereby obtained, 29 asserting that the requirements for probable cause established in Aguilar v. Texas' ° had not
19 Id

at

2325-26.

Id. at 2326.
21 People v. Gates, 85 Il. 2d 376, 380, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
22 People v. Gates, 82 11. App. 3d 749, 752, 403 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1980), af 'd, 85 I1.
2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
23 Id at 752 & n.i, 403 N.E.2d at 79 & n.1.
24 Id. at 752, 403 N.E.2d at 79.
25 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
20

26 Id.
27 People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 752, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1980), af d, 85 Ill. 2d
376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
28 Id
29 People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
30 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
For an explanation of the Aguilar "two-pronged test" for
probable cause, see ihfia notes 82-90 and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:189

been met.3 1 Specifically, the defendants argued that the anonymous
letter did not set forth the underlying basis upon which the information was acquired, and that there had been no showing that the au32
thor was a "reliable" source.
The Circuit Court of DuPage County granted the defendants'
motion and the State of Illinois appealed. 3 On appeal, the prosecution argued that because there had been full corroboration of the
allegations set forth in the letter, there was a "substantial basis" for
crediting the information supplied.3 4 In affirming the trial court's
decision, the Illinois appellate court held that the information supplied in the anonymous letter did not "contain sufficient detail to
allow the issuing judge to reasonably infer that the informer had obtained his information in a reliable way."'3 5 Upon the state's subsequent petition for leave to appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed, noting that the anonymous letter, coupled with Mader's
affidavit, were insufficient to establish probable cause to issue a
warrant.36

The State of Illinois filed a petition seeking review and the
31 People v. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
32 People v. Gates, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 752-53, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1980), aJ'd,85
Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
They further argued that the evidence obtained by Detective Mader through independent investigation in no way corroborated any accusations of criminal activity. People v.
Gates, 85 111. 2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'dsubnom. Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317 (1983); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (discussing
independent corroboration as additional factor in meeting requirements for establishing
probable cause).
33 People v. Gates, 85 Il.2d 376, 377, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'd sub noma.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
34 People v. Gates, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 754, 403 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1980), affd, 85 Ill.
2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsubnom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). By
employing a "substantial basis" argument, the State of Illinois, in effect, adopted the test
for probable cause articulated by the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960).
35 People v. Gates, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 754, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1980), aft'd, 85 Ill.
2d
376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'dsub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Judge
Lindberg, writing for the majority, maintained that since the test for probable cause set
forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969), was not met, the lower court's order to quash and suppress must be affirmed.
Gates, 82 Il1. App. 3d at 754, 403 N.E.2d at 80.
36 People v. Gates, 85 Il.2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). The Illinois Supreme Court first applied the
two-pronged test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and found that its
requirements were not satisfied. The court then analyzed Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969), to determine if the corroboration supplied by Detective Mader was
sufficient to cure the failure of the Agu'lar test. The Court found that such evidence
corroborated only "innocent" activity and was therefore insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 37 While the Gates
Court agreed that the letter alone did not provide a basis for establishing probable cause, it nonetheless reversed the state court's decision. 8 The Court determined that because major portions of the
letter's predictions were corroborated by the information provided
by Federal agents, the warrant had been properly issued. 9
Since the early nineteenth century, in the seminal case of Locke v.
United States,40 the United States Supreme Court has analyzed the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement in exhaustive detail. 4 ' In that case, Chief Justice Marshall defined probable cause as
"less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction.42 Chief Justice Marshall failed, however, to prescribe the minimum quantum of evidence that would be necessary to support a
finding of probable cause, 43 and the Court has greatly elaborated
upon his early definition in numerous subsequent decisions.
In Carrollv. UnitedStates,4 decided in 1925, the Court articulated
what has remained a viable and fundamental standard for determining the existence of probable cause. 5 Chief Justice Taft stated
therein that probable cause exists when an officer has personal
knowledge or "reasonably trustworthy information" as to facts and
circumstances that "are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution" to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.4 6
Although Chief Justice Taft's analysis has become the standard for
judging the propriety of a finding of probable cause, 47 additional in37 Gates,

103 S. Ct. at 2321.

Id. at 2326, 2336.
39 Id at 2336.
40 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
41 See generally LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on
Fourth Amendment Adudt'ation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2-3 (noting "the Supreme Court fre38

quently has confronted [the probable cause] issue," and discussing "inconsistencies,"
"divergencies and obscurities which currently exist").
42 Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348.
43 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), wherein Justice Rutledge indicated that according to Justice Marshall's opinion in Locke, probable cause was no more
than "bare suspicion." Brznegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
44 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
45 See Comment, Informer's Word As the Basisfor Probable Cause tn the Federal Courts, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965).
46 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.

Chief Justice Taft concluded that the search and seizure
in Carroll was justified, based upon his synthesis of a number of previous cases defining
probable cause. Id at 161-62.
47 Subsequent to Carroll, however, there have been many additional interpretations
of the probable cause requirement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
108 (1965) (Probable cause "must be tested and interpreted.., in a commonsense and
realistic fashion. [Search warrants] are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and
haste of criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once ex-
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quiries as to reliability must be made when the issuance of a warrant
is based on an "informant's tip."4 8 Distinguishing those tips that are
"reasonably trustworthy" under Carroll from those that are not has
been not only a recurring issue, but49"one of the most important in
the field of search and seizure law."

The Supreme Court was first called upon to determine the reliability or trustworthiness of an informant's tip in Draper v. United
States,5° a case involving a warrantless search pursuant to arrest. The
critical issue in that case was whether corroboration of information
given to an arresting officer could, by itself, constitute probable
cause. 51 Therein, a "previously reliable" informant 52 alerted a narcotics agent that James Draper would be arriving in Denver by train
from Chicago on one of two specified dates and would be carrying
three ounces of heroin.5 3 The informant supplied a detailed description of Draper's physical appearance, including the clothing he
would be wearing. Moreover, the informant stated that Draper habitually "walked real fast," and would be carrying a tan zipper
bag.5 4 At the Denver station, the agent was able to corroborate virtually all of the allegations, and in a warrantless search pursuant to
arrest, he found three ounces of heroin in Draper's raincoat pocket. 5
acted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area."); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.").
48 Not only can an informant's tip provide constitutionally adequate grounds for
arrest or search, but such information, and persons supplying it, have also proved to be
valuable parts of the law enforcement effort. See Comment, supra note 45, at 840; see also
Donnelly, Judt'ialControl of Informants, Specs, Stool tigeons, andAgent Provocateurs, 60 YALE

LJ. 1091, 1093 (1951) (informers particularly effective in enforcement of certain proscribed behavior). See generally M. HARNEY & J. CROSS,.THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1962).
49 Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meantzg/ul

Standards,81 YALE L.J. 703, 703 n.3 (1972) (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
575 (1971)).
50 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
51

See id at 310-11.

Id at 309. The informant, Hereford, had been engaged as a "special employee" of
the Denver Narcotics Bureau and, from time to time over a six-month period, had given
Marsh information regarding violations of the narcotics laws. Hereford was paid small
sums of money, and Marsh had always found his information to be accurate and reliable. Id See infra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion on past performance of
52

informants as a means of establishing credibility.
53 Draper, 358 U.S. at 309.
54 Id. Hereford described the defendant as "a Negro of light brown complexion, 27
years old, 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighing about 160 pounds," and stated that he "was
wearing a light colored raincoat, brown slacks and black shoes." Id at 309 n.2.
55 Id at 309-10.
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The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and
subsequent search, determining that the "hearsay" information supplied by the informant and thereafter corroborated by the agent constituted "legally competent evidence.' '56 Justice Whittaker reasoned
that because the agent had personally verified nearly all the provided
details, his belief that the suspect
would be carrying heroin, although
57
reasonable.
was
unverified,
Relying on the standard of probable cause enunciated in Carroll,58 the DraperCourt held that corroboration of an informer's allegations was sufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. 59 As a
result of that holding, however, the Court would later grapple with
whether only the details of innocent activity alleged by an informant
need to be corroborated, or whether verification of incriminating details is a requisite for establishing probable cause.'
In 1960, the Court expanded upon its holding in Draperin Jones
v.UnitedSlates,6 ' holding unequivocally that not only was it appropriate for a magistrate to accept hearsay in determining probable cause,
but also that such hearsay could independently satisfy the dictates of
the fourth amendment.6 2 In Jones, an affidavit signed by a detective
assigned to a District of Columbia narcotics squad was the sole evidence upon which a search warrant was issued. 63 The affidavit dis56 Id at 311-13. The Court acknowledged that since Hereford's "information had
always been found accurate and reliable, it [was] clear that Marsh [the agent] would
have been derelict in his duties had he not pursued [the tip]." Id at 313.

7d
57

Id. at 313-14. The Draper Court also relied on its analysis of probable cause in
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
59 Draper, 358 U.S. at 313-14. But see id at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas, also applying the Carroll standard, disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that there were "reasonable grounds to believe" that an offense was being committed.
He noted that "[t]he arresting officers did not know the grounds on which the informer basedhis
conclusion; nor did they seek to find out what they were. They acted solely on the infoner's
word. In my view, that was not enough." Id at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
Justice Douglas's dissent, in effect, provided that the establishment of probable
cause, based on an informant's tip, requires that the basis of the informer's knowledge be
known to the arresting officers. See id; accordGiordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
486 (1958) (warrant not granted where no allegation of personal knowledge present); cf.
Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1965) (IRS agent stated personal knowledge in complaint). But see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969) (Draper tip
sufficiently detailed to enable magistrate to infer informant's information had been
gained in reliable way).
60 See infra note 99. See generally LaFave, supra note 41, passin; Comment, Anonymous
Tis,Corroboration,and ProbableCause. Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v.
Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 104-05 (1982).
61 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
62 Id at 269-71.
63 Id at 267 & n.2.
58

196
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closed no direct knowledge on the part of the affiant of illicit drug
trafficking by the defendant. 64 Rather, it stated that the affiant had
received information from an unnamed source,6 5 that the source had
given him correct information previously, and that the same information had been supplied by other sources.66
TheJones Court rejected the defendant's argument that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause because it rested
wholly on hearsay rather than setting forth the affiant's personal observations.6 7 The Court held, instead, that "[a]n affidavit is not to be
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantialbasis for crediting the hearsay is presented." 68 Alluding to Draper,theJones Court
reasoned that if an officer could utilize only hearsay in determining
whether there was probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest, then
the presentation of such evidence by an affidavit should afortioribe a
sufficient basis to support the issuance of a warrant. 69 Thus, concluded the Court, even absent production of the informants or disclosure of their names, its substantial basis requirement had been
satisfied.70 The Court, however, failed to delineate exactly what
would constitute a substantial basis for crediting hearsay. 7
Four years later, in Aguilar v. Texas,7 2 the Court articulated more
structured guidelines for the evaluation of hearsay information.7 3
64 Id at 267. The affidavit stated, however, that the defendant, a known drug user
was familiar to the detective and other members of the narcotics squad. Id at 268 n.2.
TheJones Court observed that this fact "made the charge against him much less subject
to scepticism than would be such a charge against one without such a history." Id at
271.
65 Id at 268. That the informant remained unnamed was immaterial insofar as his
reliability or credibility was concerned. Because he had provided reliable information in
the past, and because his identity was known to the affiant, he could properly be classified as a "confidential" informant, and thus, his identity was protected from disclosure.
See id.at 271-72; see also McCray v. United States, 386 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1967) (state
court under no absolute duty to require disclosure of informer's identity); Comment,
supra note 45, at 840 (discussing "'informer's privilege' as a device for encouraging informers to communicate information without fear of subsequent retribution") (citation
omitted). But cf.Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-63 (1957) (protecting disclosure of informer's identity must be balanced "against the individual's right to prepare
his defense").
66 Jones, 362 U.S. at 267-69, 267 n.2.
67 Id at 269.
68 Id (emphasis added). For examples of other cases applying this "substantial basis"
test, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
69 Jones, 362 U.S. at 270.
70 Id at 272.
71 Moylan, Hearsayand ProbableCause. An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L.
REV. 741, 745 (1974).
72 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
73 See Moylan, supra note

71, at 745.
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Once again, it was confronted with the validity of a search warrant
issued pursuant to an affidavit based only upon hearsay. 74 Two
Houston police officers had applied for a warrant to search Aguilar's
home for narcotics, stating in their affidavit only that they had "received reliable information from a credible person" regarding the defendant's alleged criminal conduct.7 5
In evaluating whether that affidavit sufficiently established
probable cause, Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, reiterated
the Jones principle that an informant's tip alone could be sufficient.76
The Aguzlar Court, however, fashioned a two-pronged test for ascertaining whether an informant's tip could establish the existence of
probable cause.7 7 The first prong-the "basis of knowledge" testrequired that the issuing magistrate be apprised of some of the underlying circumstances upon which the informant based his allegations. 78 The second prong-the "veracity" test-required that the
officer support his conclusion that either the informant, who could
remain unidentified, was "credible" or that the information provided
was "reliable." 79 The Aguzilar Court emphasized that the issuing
74

See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109.

75 Id Justice Goldberg observed that "[t]he record does not reveal, nor is it claimed,

that any other information was brought to the attention of the Justice of the Peace." Id
at 109 n. 1. Compare this with the affidavit in Jones, supra notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text.
76 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; seeJones, 362 U.S. at 269 (direct observations by affiant
not required).
77 See id The oft-mentioned "Aguilar two-pronged test" was first labeled as such in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969), as were the terms that would come to
describe the prongs. See Moylan, supra note 71, at 102 n.34.
78 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. This prong requires that the affiant indicate either how
the information was received by the informant, or his basis for alleging the criminal
conduct in question. See LaFave, supra note 41, at 4; see also Burnett, Evaluation ofAfidavis andIssuance ofSearch Warrants: A Practical Guide for Federal Magistrates,64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 270, 271-72 (1973) (unless affidavit demonstrates how informant received
his information, search warrant should not issue). The first prong is also satisfied if the
affidavit describes the informant's personal observation of criminal activity. See Comment, supra note 60, at 102 & n.35 (sample of cases in which such affidavits were held
sufficient); see alsoJones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 268 n.2 (affidavit revealed informant had gone to defendant's apartment to purchase narcotics).
79 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. It is in this sense that the "veracity" prong is said to have
two "spurs," a "credibility" spur and a "reliability" spur, either of which, if met, can
satisfy the second prong requirement. See LaFave, supranote 41, at 4. See generally, MoyIan, supra note 71, at 757-65.
The credibility spur invariably involves a showing of the informant's "past performance" or his character (his reputation and demonstrated history of honesty and integrity). See LaFave, supra note 41, at 10. If the informant had given reliable and accurate
information in the past, which led to arrests and convictions, he is deemed credible, and
the "veracity prong" is satisfied. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informant had supplied officer with accurate information some 15 or 16 times, resulting in
numerous arrests and convictions); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (over
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magistrate may consider only information that is actually contained
in the affidavit.' Because the affidavit in Aguilar recited none of the
"underlying circumstances," the Court found that the issuing judge
had necessarily accepted "mere conclusions."8
The Court's test,
therefore, had not been met.82
One year after the Aguilar test for probable cause was established, it was supplemented by the Court in Ventresca v. United States."
Reaffirming its Aguilar holding, the Court directed that affidavits
submitted in support of the issuance of search warrants be tested and
interpreted in a "commonsense and realistic fashion."8 4 According to
the Ventresca Court, the "technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under the common law" were improper.8 5
In Spine//' v. United States,8 6 decided five years after Aguilar, the
Court added a new dimension to probable cause analysis-the "corsix month period, informant had given officer information regarding violations of narcotics laws which officer had always found to be accurate and reliable).
The Supreme Court, in Aguilar, did not discuss satisfaction of the reliability spur.
See LaFave, supra note 41, at 5. Professor LaFave suggests that to meet that spur, courts
must consider whether, in a particular instance, the informant's information is reliable,
by focusing "upon the nature of the information given and the circumstances under
which that information was tendered." Id at 23. As an illustration of how the reliability spur can be met, Professor LaFave cites United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583
(1971). LaFave, supra note 41, at 5.
80 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109-14. The Court relied on Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 486 (1958) (only information brought to magistrate's attention may be considered by reviewing court), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("inferences [to] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"). The
Aguilar Court held that if the magistrate considers more than what is contained in the
affidavit or in some other way does not perform his neutral and detached function, he
would "serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111. But cf
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (Court considered surrounding circumstances to determine probable cause in warrantlesssearch).
81 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113-14. Justice Goldberg noted that "the source here merely
suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession,"
and the magistrate "certainly could not 'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts
relied on. . . to show probable cause.'" Id (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 486 (1958)).
82 Id at 114-15.
83 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
84 Id at 108. The Ventresca approach appears to create some confusion as to whether
the requirements of the Aguilar test must be strictly complied with, or whether they can
be ignored if common sense indicates that probable cause existed. See Moylan, supra
note 71, at 961. The author suggests that the Court "probably meant only that commonsense should be used in determining whether sufficient circumstances have been set
forth to pass each of the tests required by Aguilar." Id at 961 n.20.
85 Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108. The Ventresca Court reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract."
Id
86

393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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roboration factor." ' Justice Harlan noted in that case that the sufficiency of an affidavit must first be measured against the Aguilar test
and that, "[i]f the tip is found inadequate under Agutlar, the other
allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered.""8 He qualified his analysis,
however, by requiring that even if certain parts of a tip are corroborated by independent sources, it must still be as trustworthy a tip as
one that would pass the Aguilar test without corroboration. 9
The Spineli majority expressly rejected the "totality of the circumstances" approach, 9' which was taken by the court of appeals,
reasoning that where an informant's tip is a necessary element in establishing probable cause, a more precise analysis is necessary. 9' The
Court determined that neither prong of the Aguilar test had been satisfied, inasmuch as the affiant offered no evidence in support of his
conclusion that the informant was reliable and presented no underlying circumstances indicating how the informant learned that Spinelli
was involved in illegal gambling activity.9 2 According to the Spineli
Court, however, that deficiency could be "cured," and probable
cause found to exist, if the independently corroborated tip was sufficiently detailed to enable a magistrate reasonably to infer that the
informant had gained his knowledge in a reliable way. 93
Using the specificity of the informant's tip in Draperas a "suitable benchmark,"9 4 Justice Harlan examined the Spinelli tip, which
alleged merely that the defendant was using two telephone lines for
gambling operations.9 5 Although FBI corroboration established that
See infra note 89.
Spinhze, 393 U.S. at 415. The SpnheliCourt provided that should the affidavit be
facially insufficient to satisfy the Agui'lar test, a magistrate or reviewing court could then
consider the specificity of details provided and corroboration thereof as a method of
meeting the fourth amendment requirement for probable cause. Id
89 Id By virtue of this requirement, the Court emphasized that it is the function of
the magistrate, not the officer, to determine whether probable cause exists. See id
90 Id ("We believe.., that the 'totality of the circumstances' approach . .. paints
with too broad a brush."). Butsee Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) ("[W]e
reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.").
91 Spthelh 393 U.S. at 415.
92 Id at 416.
93 Id at 417. Justice Harlan stipulated that the criminal activity must be described
in sufficient detail so that it is reasonable for the magistrate to believe that the informant
"is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation." Id at 416.
But see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 582 (1971) (suspect's reputation, among
other things, may be considered).
94 Spbneli 393 U.S. at 416.
95 d at 413-17. Although Justice Harlan conceded that in both situations there was
87

88
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Spinelli did, in fact, have access to an apartment containing two
phones, the Court found that such verification was not sufficiently
suggestive of criminal conduct.9 6 Justice Harlan reasoned that because there is nothing unusual about an apartment containing two
separate telephones, corroboration of such a seemingly innocent detail could hardly bespeak criminal activity.9 7 He found the allegation that Spinelli was a "known" gambler and an associate of
gamblers to be "but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion
that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision."' 98 The Spinelh"Court thus articulated a method by which the
Agu'lar test could be satisfied indirectly-self-verifying details could
serve to provide an implied basis of knowledge or inferred
trustworthiness. 9
In Gates, the Supreme Court expressly abandoned the AguilarSpineli standard for evaluating an affidavit that is based on a partially corroborated anonymous letter, and adopted in its place a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. m Justice Rehnquist, writing
corroboration of only innocent details, he reasoned that the independent police work in
Draper corroborated much more than the one small detail that had been provided in
Spinelli, and thus, the magistrate in Drapercould have reasonably inferred reliability. Id
at 417. Justice Fortas, dissenting, believed, however, that the Spinelli affidavit contained
many detailed facts, thereby justifying the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 437 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Black, in a separate dissenting opinion, agreed that the Spini affidavit was sufficiently detailed, and he explicitly rejected Aguilars two-pronged test. Id
at 429-30 (Black, J., dissenting). He criticized the Spineli majority's concern with detail,
observing that "[n]othing in our Constitution . . . requires that the facts be established
with that degree of certainty and with such elaborate specificity." Id. at 429 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
96 Id. at 418. The Court found that mere investigation and corroboration of two
telephone numbers did not create "an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informant's tip."
Id
97 Id at 414. Justice Harlan commented that "[m]any a householder indulges himself in this petty luxury." Id It is interesting to note that after execution of the warrant
and subsequent search of the apartment, the officers found a box containing three additional uninstalled telephones. Id at 418 n.6.
98 Id at 414 (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933)).

99 Whether the Spinelli Court meant that a deficiency in either or both of the Aguilar

prongs could be cured through corroboration has been the subject of much controversy.
Compare, e.g., Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (1974) (" 'selfverifying detail' technique cannot repair a defect in 'veracity' prong") with Spinelli' 393
U.S. at 425-27 (White, J., concurring) (self-verification relates only to the veracity
prong). See LaFave, supra note 41, at 7-68 for a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding SpinIi's self-verification method.
100 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. The Gates majority explained that while it was rejecting
the "rigid categorization suggested by some of [Spine//i's] language," it was not abandoning "Spineli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the principle that
it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of probable cause." Id at 2332
n.ll.
In Speinell-ike situations, where the sufficiency of a tip is measured in accordance
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for the majority, postulated that the new approach would permit a
"balanced assessment" of the various indicia of reliability, whereas
the Aguilar-Spinelitest unduly focused on isolated issues which could
not sensibly be segregated from the facts as a whole.'
The Gates Court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that an
"informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge' are all
highly relevant [factors] in determining the value"' 2 of a tip, but it
did not share the latter's belief that they should be viewed as separate
and distinct requirements to be "rigidly exacted in every case."' 0 3
Justice Rehnquist stated that although the Aguilar-Spineli prongs
may prove useful in ascertaining whether there has been a showing of
probable cause, he reasoned that the totality of the circumstances
analysis comports more closely with the Court's prior treatment of
probable cause than do the inflexible requirements of the twopronged test. 4
Employing the descriptions of probable cause articulated in
Brinegarv. United States'0 5 and United States v. Cortez,'1 6 Justice Rehnquist construed probable cause as being a "fluid concept-turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."'0 7 He
emphasized that because affidavits ordinarily are hastily drafted by
with the amount of detail presented and the degree of corroboration, the issue of innocent versus incriminating details again surfaces. Some commentators have strongly suggested that there should be some corroboration of an incriminating detail and not
simply verification of innocuous details. See, e.g., Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time
Informer, 43 COLO. L. REV. 357, 362-63 (1972); Comment, The Informer's Tip as Probable
Cause for Search andArrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 966-68 (1969).

101 Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. The majority asserted that lower courts were applying
the two-pronged test in an overly technical and unduly rigid manner. Id.at 2330 n.9
(citing People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 36 (1971); People v. Palanza, 55 Ill.
App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978); Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Cr. [sic]
App. 1974)). See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 515-22, 313 A.2d 847, 852-58 (1974)
(expressly rejecting possibility of meeting probable cause requirement other than
through strict adherence to two-pronged test).
102 Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2327.
103 Id at 232 7-28. Justice Rehnquist explained that the Aguilar language necessitated
only a showing of "some of the underlying circumstances" from which a basis of knowledge, reliability, and credibility could be ascertained. Id at 2328 n.6 (quoting Aguilar,
378 U.S. at 114).
04 Id at 2328.
105 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949) ("probable cause is a practical, nontechnical
conception").
106 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement.").
107 Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. Justice Rehnquist also observed that "[olne simple rule
will not cover every situation." Id at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147 (1972)).
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nonlawyers, it is unlikely that the "complex superstructure" of the
Aguilar-Spineli test would prove helpful to magistrates making probable cause determinations.108 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the
established preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant,
but he noted that retention of the Aguilar-Spinelh standard could result in a far greater number of warrantless searches by police hoping
to fit within some exception to the warrant requirement.1" 9 In the
majority's opinion, the probable cause standard developed in Jones,
that the magistrate have a " 'substantial basis' for concluding that a
search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing," would better encourage recourse to warrants.110
The Gates majority maintained that anonymous tips could rarely
survive the rigorous Aguilar-Spinelh"requirements."1 Accordingly,
their future value in police work would be greatly diminished.1 12
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Aguilar-Spinelh"test could seriously hinder law enforcement activities, and he implied that unless
the totality of the circumstances approach is utilized, magistrates
might be forced to ignore potentially valuable tips.113
The Gates Court did, however, articulate some limitations "beId at 2330-31.
109 Id at 2331. Justice Rehnquist additionally explained that
[t]he possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search
greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by
assuring 'the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his
power to search.'
Id.(quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977)).
110 Id (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). Not only did the
Court rely heavily on the Jones "substantial basis" test for probable cause, but it also
impliedly equated it with the "totality of the circumstances" approach: "In .. .place
[of the two-pronged test] we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations." Id at 2332 (citing Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)). The Gates Court also believed that theJones standard would be more consistent with the Court's traditionally deferential treatment of a
magistrate's determination than was the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id at 2331. For a discussion of Jones, see supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
108

11

Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331-32.

Id
ates approach, the issuing magistrate was
113 Id Under the
to make a practical, .common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable
cause existed.
Id at 2332.
112
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yond which a magistrate [could] not venture."' 4 The majority
noted that "wholly conclusory statements" in an affidavit could not
provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause, and that
issuance by a magistrate of a warrant could not be a "mere ratification of bare conclusions of others.""' 5 The Court concluded that,
even under a totality of the circumstances analysis, a "barebones"
affidavit could not satisfy the requirements of the fourth
amendment. "6
Based upon this foundation, Justice Rehnquist analyzed the
facts surrounding the affidavit in question."17 Citing Draper,the majority underscored the probative value of police corroboration as a
basis for determining probable cause."' Because so many of the details contained in the anonymous letter were substantiated by independent investigation, the Court concluded that probable cause
had been established as convincingly as it had been in Draper."9
Justice Rehnquist noted a significant difference between the two
cases: The informant in Draper had been reliable on two previous
occasions, whereas the Gates informant's honesty and reliability were
unknown. 2 ° In the majority's opinion, however, the police work
done by Mader and the DEA minimized that distinction.'12 While
conceding that the tip in Gates might not pass the Spi e//" test, the
14 Id
115 Id (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 (1933)). The Court noted
that, for example, "a sworn statement of an affiant that 'he has cause to suspect and does
believe that' " a crime is afoot will not suffice. Id (quoting Nathanson v. United States,
290 U.S. 41, 54 (1933)). Additionally, "[a]n officer's statement that 'affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe' that heroin is stored in a
home, is likewise inadequate." Id (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).
116 Id

at 2332-33.

117 Id. at 2334-36. The Court, utilizing the totality of the circumstances approach,
reasoned that "[i]t is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources of information reduce[s] the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing 'a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.' " Id at 2335
(quotingJones, 326 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960)).
118 Id at 2334. The Gates majority observed that the Draper tip might not have survived a rigid application of the two-pronged test, a view which is consistent with its
finding that the Gates tip would not pass the Agui/ar-Spinelh"test either. See id at 2334
n.12.
119 Id at 2334. In noting that the letter alone did not constitute probable cause, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[it] provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, [it] gives
absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gates'
criminal activities." Id. at 2336.
120 Id at 2335. Because the anonymous letter had no return address, see supra note 7
and accompanying text, the Bloomingdale police could not discover who its author was,
and hence, could not inquire as to his credibility.
121 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
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Court concluded that enough of the letter's predictions had been
confirmed to permit a magistrate to make a "practical, common122
sense judgment" that probable cause had been established.
Justice White concurred in the majority's holding but rejected
its underlying analysis in favor of an examination based upon the
Aguilar-Sp'neli principles. 123 In his view, police corroboration of the
letter's allegations rendered the tip as trustworthy as one that would
satisfy the Aguilar test. He reasoned that because the informant had
specific knowledge of the Gates' unusual travel plans, it could be in124
ferred that he had obtained his information in a reliable manner.
Justice White strongly objected to the majority's decision to abandon
the two-pronged test, envisioning "an evisceration of the probable
cause standard."' 25 He felt that the totality of the circumstances approach operated to reject the holdings of prior Supreme Court decisions that had been incorrectly used by the majority for its
support. 26 Moreover, he was reluctant to endorse a standard that
did not expressly require the offering of some proof from which the
credibility of the informant and the reliability of the information
could be inferred. 127 Conceding that lower courts had been applying
the Aguilar-Spineli test in an "unduly rigid manner," 128 Justice White
through
nonetheless believed that the problem should be alleviated
129
clarification of the test rather than its abandonment.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, also found the majority's rejection
of the two-pronged test to be "unjustified and ill-advised."' 3 He
explained that, because the evaluation of an affidavit that is issued
on the basis of an informant's tip involves a difficult inquiry into the
reliability and credibility of the source, that inquiry must be structured so as to provide some degree of accuracy.' 3 ' Justice Brennan
122 Id The Court implied that a "basis of knowledge" could be inferred from the
extensive details contained in the anonymous letter which concerned future actions of
third parties which could not easily be predicted. The specificity and accuracy of the
author's predictions of the Gates' travel plans were of such a character that it was very
likely to have been obtained from the Gates themselves, or someone very familiar with
their arrangements. Id
123 Id. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
124 Id at 2349-50 (White, J., concurring).
125 Id at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
126 Id
127 Id

Id See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring). Justice White believed that the
"overly-technical applications of the Aguilar-Spitelh"standard . . . could easily be disap128

129

proved without reliance on a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis." Id at 2350 n.26
(White, J., concurring).
130 Id at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'3'
Id at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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believed that "the standards announced in Aguilar, and refined in
Spinelh, fulfill that need,"13' 2 inasmuch as they both alert police to
what information must be supplied in order to secure a warrant, and
inform magistrates as to which facts must be before them in order to
properly determine whether probable cause exists. 133 He concluded
that the two-pronged test "preserve[s] the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of probable cause, insure[s] greater accuracy in
probable cause determinations, and advance[s] the substantive
34
value" of such findings. 1

Justice Brennan further observed that when an anonymous tip is
central to an evaluation of probable cause, 35 the need to apply a
structured test, in order to ensure that the warrant's issuance is based
upon reliable information received from an honest or credible person, is especially great. 13 While he noted that tips offered by anonymous informants are "presumptively unreliable,"' 137 Justice Brennan
maintained that such tips could provide the basis for a finding of
probable cause if they passed the Aguilar-Spinel" test. 3 He reasoned
that through police corroboration or the "self-verifying detail" test
set forth in Spinelli, anonymous hearsay could provide a sufficient ba3 9
sis for satisfying the requirements of the fourth amendment.
In addition to implying that the Aguilar-Spinell analysis is more
consistent with the Court's previous treatment of probable cause
than is the totality of the circumstances approach, Justice Brennan
strongly criticized the majority's continued tolerance of police prac4
tices that disregard rights guaranteed in the fourth amendment.' 0
132 Id
133

Id

134 Id at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135 Id Justice Brennan noted that prior to the Gates decision, the Supreme Court had
never directly applied the Aguilar-Sptnelt"standards to an anonymous tip. Id at 2356
(Brennan, J., dissenting). He reasoned that because, "[b]y definition, nothing is known
about an anonymous informant's identity, honesty, or reliability," there was even more
reason to apply the two-pronged test. Id See also Comment, supra note 60, in which the
author notes that "[t]he Court's only express consideration of the use of anonymous tips
occurred in dictum in Adams v. Williams," 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972), wherein the
Court compared the constitutional propriety of a "stop and frisk" based on a confidential informant's tip to a search and seizure resulting from an anonymous tip. Comment,
supra note 60, at 105-06.
136 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2356 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 Id at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accordComment, supra note 60, at 107 ("[T]he
police and the magistrate cannot know the motives of the anonymous informant-he
may be motivated by a sense of civic duty, revenge, or a desire to eliminate criminal
competition.") (citation omitted).
138 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 Id
140 Id at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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He reasoned that the Court's failure to present any persuasive rationale for its abandonment of the two-pronged test was a display of its
growing impatience with the labyrinth of rules governing search and
seizure. 4 ' Justice Brennan feared that, by replacing the AguilarSpinel/i analysis with the unstructured totality of the circumstances
approach, the majority's decision might " 'obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police state, where they are the
law.' M142
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, also concluded
that probable cause should not have been found to exist.' 4 3 He focused on what he perceived to be a critical discrepancy between the
letter's predictions and the investigations performed by Detective
Mader and the DEA,' 44 arguing that the informant's allegation that
"Sue drives their car to Flordia . . . [then] flies back" constituted a

"material mistake" because, in reality, she drove back to Bloomingdale with Lance.' 4 5 He reasoned that that discrepancy cast doubt
upon the veracity of the letter's statement concerning the presence of
drugs in the Gates' home.'4 6 As a result, he questioned the authorization to search the house.' 4 7
Justice Stevens further observed that the Gates' actual travel
plans were neither so unusual nor so indicative of criminal activity
that they should have served as the basis for a finding of probable
cause.' 4 8 He concluded that the majority's "evaluation of the warrant's validity ha[d] been colored by subsequent events,"' 4 9 and he
141

Id.

Id (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948)).
Id. at 2360-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens additionally observed that
because there are " 'constitutional differences' " between a car search and a house
search, the search of the Gates' car required a separate and different probable cause
evaluation. Id at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 339
U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
144 Id at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142

143

145

Id

Id Justice Stevens believed that the informant's allegations that the Gates already
had "over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement," coupled with the predicted "itinerary that always kept one spouse in Bloomingdale," led to a logical conclusion that
their home would never remain unprotected. Id He then reasoned that because Lance
and Sue were actually together in West Palm Beach, the allegation that there were
drugs in the Gates' home became somewhat dubious. Id
147 Id.
148 Id
149 Id. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned that because the predictions were faulty, and had been corroborated by innocent activity, the majority must
have considered events (e.g., the overnight drive, the 400 pounds of marijuana in the
car) that occurred subsequent to the warrant's issuance in order to find probable cause.
146
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attacked the Court's failure to give due consideration to the conclusions drawn by three separate levels of state courts. S
Since 1813, when the Locke Court first addressed the problem of
defining probable cause,' 5 ' the concept has undergone considerable
modification and refinement. This process of evolution is understandable; indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that there are
"vague, undefinable, admonitory provisions of the Constitution
whose scope is inevitably addressed to changing circumstances. ' 52
Assuming that the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement
is such a provision,' 5 3 the propriety of the Court's decision in Gates
rests upon whether the manner in which it altered existing probable
cause standards was constitutionally appropriate.
Finding the Agui/ar-Spinelh"two-pronged test to be too "rigorous"
and too difficult for lower courts to apply correctly,' 5 4 the Gales majority believed that its decision provided a method for equitably evaluating the validity of a warrant. Although the Court articulated
some ostensibly viable reasons for eliminating Agui/ar-Spbzelh's structured requirements, the totality of the circumstances standard does
not resolve the constitutional dilemma posed by striking a balance
between the rights of private individuals and those of society.' 5 The
Gates approach does not overtly favor either of those competing values, but because of its neutral and unstructured nature, it is likely to
Id. He also noted the impropriety of including such subsequent events in evaluating a
probable cause determination. Id (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 30, 33-35 (1970)).
150 Id. at 2361-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that a total of
nine judges and justices on three state court levels all found the Gates warrant to be
invalid due to an absence of probable cause. He further argued that since they "are
better able to evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous informants in Bloomingdale, Illinois," than the Supreme Court, their judgments should be accorded at least a
"presumption of accuracy." Id
151 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
152 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
153 It can be argued that a "changing circumstance" which "addresses" the probable
cause provision is the continually rising crime rate in the United States, as reflected
through criminological surveys and statistics. See generally A. HARTJEN, CRIME AND
CRIMINALIZATION 185-87 (1978) (while population increased by 5% between 1970 and
1975, rate of reported crime rose by 33%; if estimates of unreported crime were included,
actual increase closer to 39%); 2 CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 705 (E. Bittner &
S.L. Messinger eds. 1980) ("[C]rime is an ever-increasing part of contemporary American life.").
However, it is essential to consider whether this increase in crime justifies relaxation
of the standards for finding probable cause. It is possible that the judiciary's awareness
and concern over this problem has resulted in their willingness to invoke less stringent
requirements for establishing probable cause.
154 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9.
155 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1, at 437-38 (1978).
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generate a greater number of decisions supporting law enforcement
1
interests than would be possible under the two-pronged test. ,5

The fourth amendment mandates that individuals' rights to be
secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects," '5 7 be balanced
against the concomitant obligation that the community be protected
against wrongdoers. 5 ' Although the Gates majority indicated that it
was attempting to strike a proper balance between those opposing
interests, t59 it failed to assess realistically whether its new standard
could be applied in an unprejudicial manner. The Court believed
that relaxation of the probable cause standards was necessary in order to ensure that the states' interest in law enforcement would not
be subverted by the utilization of inappropriate criteria that might
result in criminals escaping justice on the basis of technicalities.
Given the benefit of hindsight, this rationale is certainly palatable.
Once a criminal is caught "red-handed," it is difficult to justify permitting him to evade punishment simply because the initial application for his warrant had not satisfied certain meticulous
requirements.' 60 In determining the constitutional adequacy of any
standard, however, foresight rather than hindsight should be the primary focus. Use of foresight indicates that practical application of
the totality of the circumstances approach will more readily result in
probable cause determinations favorable to law enforcement.' 6 ' An
156 Professor Yale Kamisar asserts that the totality of the circumstances approach
"achieved the accomodation of law enforcement interests to a much greater extent than

it accommodated what the Gates Court called 'private interests.' " Supreme Court Review
and ConstitutionalLaw Symposium, 52 U.S.L.W. 2228, 2230 (Oct. 25, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Law Symposium].
157 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
158 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 155, at 437-38 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959) and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)).
159 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. The Gates majority was "convinced that this flexible,
easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private
interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spineli." Id
160 It is interesting to note Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Draper, wherein he

states:
Decisions under the Fourth Amendment, taken in the long view, have not
given the protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the Amendment would seem to require. One reason, I think, is that wherever a culprit
is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is difficult
to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule protective of
law-abiding citizens is not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually
criminals. Yet the rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike.
Draper,358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
161 See Law Symposium, supra note 156, at 2330. Professor Kamisar has expressed the
belief that the totality of the circumstances approach is a standard that is largely "unreviewable," and thus more favorable to law enforcement interests. Id He states that the
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officer of the court, given the broad discretion that is permitted
under Gates, will naturally be inclined to accede to the warrant requests of other law enforcement officials, notwithstanding the possibility that an individual's constitutional rights would be infringed
thereby.
To assert that the totality of the circumstances approach is not
the most suitable standard for determining whether probable cause
exists, however, is not to imply that the Aguilar-Spinellitest is the most
appropriate analysis. The difficulties inherent in applying the twopronged test are apparent, in view of the various interpretations of its
requirements which have been issued by the Supreme Court, as well
as the lower courts. 6 2 For example, in United States v. Harris,'6 3 the
Supreme Court, while not expressly overruling Aguilar or Spieli,
clearly deviated from the spirit of those decisions. The Spineli Court
had asserted that a suspect's reputation should not be taken into consideration when evaluating probable cause, yet the Court held in
Harris that a magistrate should not be precluded from relying on
such "probative information" in deciding whether to issue a warrant.' 6 4 Moreover, by allowing an informant's statement against penal interest' 6 5 to be sufficient to satisfy the veracity prong,'6 6 the
Harrs Court departed from the Aguilar-Spinelirequirements.' 6 7 Furthermore, in separate concurrences, Justice Blackmun would have
overruled Spine//i 6 and Justice Black would have overruled both
Gates majority makes it plain that the task of a reviewing court is "modest .
[..
[T]he
warrant is to be upheld as long as there is a 'substantial basis' for a 'fair probability' that
evidence will be found in a particular case." Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good
Faith," and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551, 569-70 (1984). Under the Gates standard of
review, then, it appears that absent a clear abuse of discretion, a magistrate's probable
cause finding will be affirmed.
162 See supra notes 101 & 129; see also Note, Illinois v. Gates: The Court Turns from Technicahty to Practicality for Search Warrant Probable Cause Determinations, 35 MERCER L. REV.
725, 732-33 (1984) (two conflicting methods of applying two-pronged test were prevalent
throughout lower courts).
163 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
164 Id at 582. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Harrs Court, criticized the Spinelli
Court's interpretation of the holding in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
According to the Chief Justice, Nathanson had held that "reputation, standing alone, was
insufficient; it surely did not hold it irrelevant when supported by other information."
Harrs, 403 U.S. at 582 (emphasis in original).
165 Harris, 403 U.S. at 580. The Hams Court held that the informant's admission that
he had recently purchased whiskey from the defendant was "plainly a declaration
against interest since it could readily warrant a prosecution and could sustain a conviction against the informant himself." Id
166 Id at 583-84.
167 See Note, supra note 162, at 737 (HarrsCourt's addition of reputation as indicia of
reliability was marked departure from strict adherence to two-pronged test).
168 Hams, 403 U.S. at 586 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Aguilar and Spinel' i 69 Thus, the majority opinion in Gates was not
the first expression of dissatisfaction with the two-pronged test.
Further indicia that application of the Aguilar-Spneli standard
is troublesome is manifested by the diametrically opposed conclusions drawn by Justices White and Brennan in Gates. Both Justices
believed that the majority was incorrect in its decision to abandon
the two-pronged test.170 While they made their probable cause determinations on the basis of the Aguilar-Spineh" standard, they
reached opposite conclusions concerning the validity of the Gates
warrant171 -Justice White concurring with the majority's finding
that probable cause to issue a warrant existed,' 72 and Justice Brennan believing that it did not. 7 3 Thus, if two members of the
Supreme Court, applying the same criteria to the same factual circumstances, can arrive at different conclusions, it is difficult to imagine that such a test can be utilized accurately and consistently by our
judicial system.
In view of these substantial difficulties in implementing the
Aguilar-Sp'nelh"test, it could not remain the definitive standard for
determining the existence of probable cause. While the Gates majority's displeasure with the two-pronged test was not unfounded, its
decision to eliminate the necessity of fulfilling any requisite elements
was too extreme. The totality of the circumstances test does offer
certain guidelines.' 74 However, merely suggesting to a magistrate the
factors that should be taken into consideration, without actually requiring that particular criteria be met,' 7 5 bestows discretion that is
too broad to safeguard the individual rights that are protected under
the fourth amendment. In some areas of the law, a reasonableness
standard may be appropriate' 7 6 but in this area of criminal law,
where one's liberty is at risk, a stricter standard should be employed.
Under a totality of circumstances approach, unless there is a clear
169 Id.at 585 (Black, J., concurring).
170 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring); id at 2351 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
171 See id at 2347-50 (White, J., concurring); id.at 2351-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 Id at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
173 Id at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
175 The amorphous totality of the circumstances approach never set any hard and fast
rules; it merely articulated that the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant
were "highly relevant factors" in determining the value of a tip, and that they may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question as to whether probable cause exists. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28.
176 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 150-51 (4th ed.

1971) (to find guilt on part of tortfeasor, appropriate standard to be applied is one of
reasonableness).

19841

NOTES

abuse of discretion, there is no remedy for the individual whose constitutional rights have been mistakenly violated.
Perhaps, as suggested by Justice White,' 7 7 a better approach
would be to modify and clarify the criteria set forth in Aguzilar and
Spnelh/i by devising a set of requisite elements that courts could understand and apply consistently in assessing the existence of probable
cause. For example, a more flexible approach would be to permit
consideration of factors such as reputation, and to allow a strong
showing in one prong to overcome a slight deficiency in the other. 7 '
Although extension of the Aguilar-Spinelli test to allow for a broader
range of methods by which probable cause can be found might not
appear to differ significantly from adoption of a totality of the circumstances approach, the distinguishing element which must be retained is the requirement that an issuing magistrate satisfy some
fixed criteria. Absent such criteria, even the prospect that a reviewing court will reexamine a magistrate's determination does not provide adequate assurance that a proper balance will be struck between
the societal interest in law enforcement and the individual's right to
be free from governmental intrusions.
Subsequent to Gates, several lower courts have applied the totality of the circumstances approach. The view of those courts has overwhelmingly been that the "basis of knowledge" and "veracity"
prongs, along with the Spineih"explication, must remain integral parts
of probable cause determinations. 179 Despite the lingering influence
of the Agut'ar-Spnelianalysis in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
177

Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).

Conversely, under Justice Rehnquist's view, an absolute deficiency in one prong
could be satisfied by a strong showing in the other. See id. at 2329.
It has never been clear whether the corroboration of a tip by independent police
work could suffice to overcome a deficiency in only the basis of knowledge prong, or
whether the veracity prong could be similarly satisfied. See supra note 99. One method
of compromise between the two-pronged test and the Gates approach, then, would be to
allow either of those prongs to be satisfied through corroboration as per Spznelli.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Kolodziej, 712 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1983) (although totality
of circumstances test applied, court found warrant invalid because underlying facts regarding informant's basis of knowledge or reliability were not shown); United States v.
Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1983). The Sorrells court applied what it referred to as
the Gates totality of the circumstances approach, but which, in reality, was much more
akin to the Aguilar-Spieli test:
We do not, however, recommend or endorse omissions in the affidavit of the
informant's credibility or reliability. The test in Aguilar has served many
useful purposes aside from insuring that the constitutional rights of citizens
be respected. It has given to law enforcement officers, prosecuting attorneys
and courts a straightforward test for resolving disputes over the issuance of a
warrant.
Id at 1528-29.
178
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recently reaffirmed its rejection of the test in Massachusetts v. Upton,'
wherein it dismissed the interpretation of the totality of the circumstances analysis advanced by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 8 '
The latter court, finding it difficult to discern whether Gates had significantly altered the requirements for issuance of search warrants,
relied upon the Aguilar-Spthelh"approach. 1 2 Noting that the Massachusetts court had "misunderstood" Gates, the Supreme Court reversed. 183 It explained that it "[had] not merely refine[d] or
qualiqied] the 'two-pronged test.'"184

It is evident that lower Federal courts as well as state courts are
reluctant to abandon totally the Aguilar-Spelh test in favor of the
standardless Gates approach.' 8 5 This should indicate that the totality
of the circumstances approach may not provide a sufficient analytical framework to determine the existence of probable cause. It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will gradually take a more
permissive attitude in issuing warrants under the Gates analysis. Justice White's fear that the totality of the circumstances approach
"may foretell an evisceration of the probable cause standard,"' 8 6
while perhaps extreme, was not entirely groundless. If the Supreme
Court continues, in the name of effective law enforcement ,187 to encourage the issuance of warrants without providing clearer guide180 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
181 Id at 2087-88. The Supreme Court believed that the Massachusetts court "apparently viewed Gates as merely adding a new wrinkle to this two-pronged test," and criticized the lower court's decision for not considering the subject affidavit in its entirety, as
the Gates standard requires. Id at 2087.

Id at 2086-87.
Id at 2087.
184 Id
182
183

185 See State v. Jackson, 53 U.S.L.W. 1049, 1050 (Wash., Oct. 2, 1984) (refusing to
"blindly" follow Gates approach and retaining, instead, Aguilar-Spinheiapproach). Contra
Potts v. State 53 U.S.L.W. 2195 (Md., Aug. 28, 1984) (following Gates); State v. Arrington, 53 U.S.L.W. 2195 (N.C., Aug. 22, 1984)(same).
186 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
187 It is essential to note that in its most recent cases involving criminal procedure
decisions, the Supreme Court has adopted new standards which clearly favor law enforcement interests. For example, in Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2507 (1984), the
Court recognized and adopted the so-called "ultimate or inevitable discovery" exception
to the exclusionary rule. That doctrine holds that if the sought-after evidence would
eventually have been discovered even if no misconduct had taken place, such evidence is
not rendered inadmissable on that score. d at 2509. Additional evidence of the Court's
desire to provide for more effective law enforcement can be found in two recently-decided cases wherein the exclusionary rule was modified so as to provide for a good-faith
exception. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court had first considered modification of
the exclusionary rule in Gates. The Court, however, declined to rule on the issue, because it has not been addressed by the lower courts. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2321-25.
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lines, it will be difficult to view the fourth amendment as the
safeguard for individual rights which it was intended to be.
Carol M. Romano

